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AUTHOR: 


McTAGGART,  JOHN 

McTAGGART  ELLIS 


TITLE: 


THE  RELATION  OF  TIME 
AND  ETERNITY 

PLACE: 

BERKELEY 

DA  TE : 

1908 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARHFT 


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V.2 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


V 


■I.  I  ■■■nil 


.VcTaecart,  John   HcT'ir-p.art  Ellis,  1866-1926. 

The  relation  of  tino  an i  eternity  ^h^-,   John 
lis  UoTaccprU     Borkeloy,  University  press,  190b. 


23  p 


23  en  in  2&/>  ou. 


Acldron;:  borore   the  l^hilosophical  union  of  the 
Univoi-aity  or  CaUPornia,   August  23,   1907. 

■Roprinto.l  r.-'.,.  M.,  Uv.ivori-ity  of  California 
chroniclo,  vol..   in,   no.  2. 

Volume  of  panpiil(t>tr. 


,  U-- - -- 


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THE  RELATION  OF  TINE  AND  ETERNITY 


JOHN   ELLIS  MCTAGGART 


I^HILOdOPHICAL  VNION 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


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UNIVERSITY    OF  CALIFORNIA 


THE  RELATION  OF  TIME  AND  ETERNITY 


JOHN  ELLLIS  McTAGGART 


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[Reprinted  from  the  Univiesitt  of  Califoenia  Cheoniclb  Vol.  X,  No.  2] 


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BERKELEY 

THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

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THE  RELATION  OF  TIME  AND  ETERNITY.* 


John  Ellis  McTaggart. 


1.  The  true  nature  of  Time,  and  especially  the  question 
how  far  it  is  absolutely  real,  have  been  much  discussed  in 
philosophy.  But  there  is,  I  think,  no  ambiguity  in  speaking 
of  Time.  Everyone  means  by  Time  the  same  characteristic 
of  experience — a  characteristic  present  in  the  experience  of 
each  of  us. 

Time,  however,  does  not  admit  of  definition.  There  are, 
indeed,  several  general  qualities  which  we  can  ascribe  to  it. 
We  can  say,  for  example,  that  it  forms  a  single  series,  and 
an  irreversible  series.  But  these  predicates,  and  any  others 
we  can  add  to  them,  do  not  form  an  adequate  definition  of 
Time.  Something  might  have  all  of  them,  and  yet  not  be 
Time.  And  thus  we  must  say  that  Time  does  not  admit  of 
definition.  If  a  person  has  not  got  the  idea  of  Time,  no 
combination  of  other  ideas  will  give  it  to  him. 

2.  Eternity  is  a  more  ambiguous  word.  It  is  used  in  at 
least  three  distinct  senses:  to  denote  unending  time,  to  de- 
note the  timelessness  of  truths,  and  to  denote  the  timeless- 
ness  of  existences. 

The  first  sense  need  not  detain  us  long.  It  is  admitted 
to  be  a  rather  improper  use  of  the  word,  and  is  only  im- 
portant on  account  of  its  frequency.  The  great  majority 
of  people,  for  example,  who  say  that  they  believe  that  they 
will  live  eternally,  do  not  mean  that  they  believe  in  a  time- 
less life,  but  that  they  believe  in  a  life  in  time  which  will 

•  Address  before  the  Philosophical  Union  of  the  University  of 
California,  August  23,  1907. 


I 


»    -*'W  *  ^    k 


t, 


never  end.  This  is  not  the  only  idea  in  the  popular  concep- 
tion of  immortality,  nor  the  best,  but  it  is  the  most  common. 
In  this  sense  the  relation  of  Eternity  to  Time  is,  of  course, 
very  simple.  Time — finite  Time — is  simply  a  part  of  Eter- 
nity. 

We  pass  on  to  the  deeper  meanings  of  Eternity.  But 
first  I  should  wish  to  say  that,  although  it  may  be  a  shallow 
view  of  Eternity  to  see  nothing  in  it  but  unending  Time,  yet 
I  cannot  regard  the  question  of  unending  existence  in  time 
with  the  contempt  with  which  it  is  sometimes  treated.  If, 
for  example,  it  were  proved  that  the  true  nature  of  man  was 
timelessly  eternal,  yet  I  cannot  see  that  the  question  of  his 
future  existence  in  time  would  be  either  unmeaning  or  un- 
important. It  would,  on  any  theory,  have  as  much  meaning 
as  the  statement  of  his  present  existence  in  time — which  may 
be  partially  inadequate,  but  has  certainly  some  meaning. 
And  it  may  very  well  have  great  importance.  This,  how- 
ever, is  a  digression. 

3.  The  second  sense  in  which  Eternity  is  used  is  to  de- 
note that  timelessness  which  is  said  to  be  possessed  by  all 
general  laws,  and,  indeed,  by  all  truths,  particular  as  well 
as  general.  *  *  The  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles.''  *'The  flash  of  a  distant  cannon  is  seen  before  its 
report  is  heard.''  **The  date  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo  is 
the  18th  of  June,  1815. "  Of  these  truths  the  last  two  have 
reference  to  time,  and  the  third  is  not  a  general  law,  but  a 
particular  fact.  Yet,  it  is  said,  all  three  truths  are  timeless. 
Any  man's  knowledge  of  them,  indeed,  is  an  event  in  time. 
It  begins  at  a  certain  moment,  and  has  a  certain  duration. 
And  there  may  well  have  been  times  when  none  of  these 
truths  was  known  to  any  person.  But  the  truth,  it  is  said, 
must  be  distinguished  both  from  our  knowledge  of  it,  which 
is  in  time,  and  the  subject-matter  referred  to,  which  may  be 
in  time.    And  the  truth,  it  is  said,  is  always  timeless. 

There  is  much  to  be  said  for  this  view ;  but  also,  I  think, 
something  to  be  said  against  it.     I  do  not  propose  to  discuss 


« f    » 


•V     * 


' '/  • 


•  « » 


-AlO 


it  here.  It  would  take  us  too  far,  and  is  not  essential  for 
our  purpose.  For,  if  we  define  Eternity  in  this  manner,  the 
relation  of  Eternity  to  Time  is  very  simple.  It  is  simply 
the  relation  of  a  truth  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  truth. 
About  every  substance  existing  in  time,  and  about  every 
event  in  time,  however  slight  or  ephemeral,  many  proposi- 
tions— indeed,  an  infinite  number  of  propositions — ^will  be 
true.  And  since,  on  this  view,  nothing  that  exists  will  be 
eternal,  but  only  the  truths  about  them,  the  relation  between 
Eternity  and  Time  will  simply  be  a  case  of  the  relation  be- 
tween a  truth  and  the  reality  of  which  it  is  true.  What  that 
relation  is,  constitutes,  indeed,  a  highly  interesting  question. 
But  the  special  natures  of  Eternity  and  Time  will  not  enter 
into  it. 

Nor  does  the  establishment  of  an  Eternity,  in  this  sense, 
give  us  any  fresh  view  of  the  nature  of  reality,  or  afford  us 
a  glimpse  of  any  greater  permanence  or  stability  in  the  uni- 
verse than  appears  on  a  prima  facie  view  of  experience. 
Everything,  no  doubt,  has  on  this  view  a  certain  connection 
with  Eternity.  But  everything  has  exactly  the  same  con- 
nection, and  that  without  any  transformation  of  its  nature, 
but  taking  it  just  as  it  appears.  We  can  look  at  ourselves 
sub  quadam  specie  aetemitatis,  for  each  of  us  exists,  and  the 
truth  of  his  existence  is  eternal.  But  then — for  an  hour  or 
two — a  bridge-party  exists,  and  it  can  be  looked  at  sub 
quadam  specie  aetemitatis,  as  easily  as  a  human  being. 
And  so  can  the  bubbles  in  a  glass  of  soda-water — I  do  not 
mean  the  substance  of  the  water,  but  the  shape  which  it 
assumes  for  a  moment. 

And  even  events  have  the  same  timelessness.  If  I 
sneezed  on  last  Christmas  day,  the  truth  which  expresses 
that  event  is,  in  this  meaning  of  Eternity,  as  eternal  as 
the  truth  of  love,  or  of  man's  existence,  or  of  God's  exist- 
ence, if  he  exist.  No  person  and  no  thing  are  eternal  on 
this  view.  But  about  everything,  permanent,  ephemeral, 
high  and  low,  there  are  infinite  eternal  truths.     The  con- 


If 


-.  ■ 


•  •%»^<*  » 


never  end.  This  is  not  the  only  idea  in  the  popular  concep- 
tion of  immortality,  nor  the  best,  but  it  is  the  most  common. 
In  this  sense  the  relation  of  Eternity  to  Time  is,  of  course, 
very  simple.  Time — finite  Time — is  simply  a  part  of  Eter- 
nity. 

We  pass  on  to  the  deeper  meanings  of  Eternity.  But 
first  I  should  wish  to  say  that,  although  it  may  be  a  shallow 
view  of  Eternity  to  see  nothing  in  it  but  unending  Time,  yet 
I  cannot  regard  the  question  of  unending  existence  in  time 
with  the  contempt  with  which  it  is  sometimes  treated.  If, 
for  example,  it  were  proved  that  the  true  nature  of  man  was 
timelessly  eternal,  yet  I  cannot  see  that  the  question  of  his 
future  existence  in  time  would  be  either  unmeaning  or  un- 
important. It  would,  on  any  theory,  have  as  much  meaning 
as  the  statement  of  his  present  existence  in  time — ^which  may 
be  partially  inadequate,  but  has  certainly  some  meaning. 
And  it  may  very  well  have  great  importance.  This,  how- 
ever, is  a  digression. 

3.  The  second  sense  in  which  Eternity  is  used  is  to  de- 
note that  timelessness  which  is  said  to  be  possessed  by  all 
general  laws,  and,  indeed,  by  all  truths,  particular  as  well 
as  general.  *  *  The  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles."  **The  fiash  of  a  distant  cannon  is  seen  before  its 
report  is  heard.''  **The  date  of  the  Battle  of  Waterloo  is 
the  18th  of  June,  1815. ' '  Of  these  truths  the  last  two  have 
reference  to  time,  and  the  third  is  not  a  general  law,  but  a 
particular  fact.  Yet,  it  is  said,  all  three  truths  are  timeless. 
Any  man 's  knowledge  of  them,  indeed,  is  an  event  in  time. 
It  begins  at  a  certain  moment,  and  has  a  certain  duration. 
And  there  may  well  have  been  times  when  none  of  these 
truths  was  known  to  any  person.  But  the  truth,  it  is  said, 
must  be  distinguished  both  from  our  knowledge  of  it,  which 
is  in  time,  and  the  subject-matter  referred  to,  which  may  be 
in  time.    And  the  truth,  it  is  said,  is  always  timeless. 

There  is  much  to  be  said  for  this  view ;  but  also,  I  think, 
something  to  be  said  against  it.     I  do  not  propose  to  discuss 


• » 


.  Jf 


*  w  * 


it  here.  It  would  take  us  too  far,  and  is  not  essential  for 
our  purpose.  For,  if  we  define  Eternity  in  this  manner,  the 
relation  of  Eternity  to  Time  is  very  simple.  It  is  simply 
the  relation  of  a  truth  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  truth. 
About  every  substance  existing  in  time,  and  about  every 
event  in  time,  however  slight  or  ephemeral,  many  proposi- 
tions— indeed,  an  infinite  number  of  propositions — ^will  be 
true.  And  since,  on  this  view,  nothing  that  exists  will  be 
eternal,  but  only  the  truths  about  them,  the  relation  between 
Eternity  and  Time  will  simply  be  a  case  of  the  relation  be- 
tween a  truth  and  the  reality  of  which  it  is  true.  What  that 
relation  is,  constitutes,  indeed,  a  highly  interesting  question. 
But  the  special  natures  of  Eternity  and  Time  will  not  enter 

into  it. 

Nor  does  the  establishment  of  an  Eternity,  in  this  sense, 
give  us  any  fresh  view  of  the  nature  of  reality,  or  afford  us 
a  glimpse  of  any  greater  permanence  or  stability  in  the  uni- 
verse than  appears  on  a  prima  facie  view  of  experience. 
Everything,  no  doubt,  has  on  this  view  a  certain  connection 
with  Eternity.  But  everything  has  exactly  the  same  con- 
nection, and  that  without  any  transformation  of  its  nature, 
but  taking  it  just  as  it  appears.  We  can  look  at  ourselves 
sub  quadam  specie  aetemitatis,  for  each  of  us  exists,  and  the 
truth  of  his  existence  is  eternal.  But  then — for  an  hour  or 
two — a  bridge-party  exists,  and  it  can  be  looked  at  sub 
quadam  specie  asternitatis,  as  easily  as  a  human  being. 
And  so  can  the  bubbles  in  a  glass  of  soda-water — I  do  not 
mean  the  substance  of  the  water,  but  the  shape  which  it 
assumes  for  a  moment. 

And  even  events  have  the  same  timelessness.  If  I 
gneezed  on  last  Christmas  day,  the  truth  which  expresses 
that  event  is,  in  this  meaning  of  Eternity,  as  eternal  as 
the  truth  of  love,  or  of  man's  existence,  or  of  God's  exist- 
ence, if  he  exist.  No  person  and  no  thing  are  eternal  on 
this  view.  But  about  everything,  permanent,  ephemeral, 
high  and  low,  there  are  infinite  eternal  truths.     The  con- 


U 


i 


I 


elusion  may  be  correct,  but  it  cannot  be  called  very  interest- 
ing or  significant. 

The  contemplation  of  eternal  truths,  indeed,  may  be  in 
the  highest  degree  interesting  and  significant,  though 
whether  it  is — as  Spinoza  seems  to  have  held — the  highest 
activity  of  which  spirit  is  capable  may  be  doubted.  But 
then  the  contemplation  of  eternal  truths  is  not  itself  a 
truth.  It  is  an  activity.  And  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  eter- 
nal in  the  sense  which  we  have  so  far  discussed. 

4.  We  pass  to  the  third  meaning  of  Eternity,  which  will 
occupy  us  for  the  rest  of  the  paper,  in  which  it  is  used  of 
the  timelessness  of  existences.  Existence  is,  I  think,  like 
Time,  too  ultimate  to  admit  of  definition.  But  it  is  not 
difficult  to  determine  the  denotation  of  the  word.  In  so  far 
as  substances,  or  the  qualities  and  relations  of  substances, 
are  real  at  all,  they  exist.  In  so  far  as  events  are  real,  they 
exist.  On  the  other  hand,  if  truths,  and  the  ideas  which  are 
the  constituent  parts  of  truths,  have  any  independent  real- 
ity, it  is  not  a  reality  of  existence — though  of  course  our 
perceptions  of  such  truths  exist,  since  they  are  psychical 
events.  Thus  the  Emperor  of  China  exists.  His  moral 
character,  and  the  reciprocal  influences  between  him  and  his 
subjects  exist.  So  do  the  events  of  his  daily  life.  On  the 
other  hand  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle,  the  Law  of  gravi- 
tation, and  other  true  propositions  do  not  exist,  although 
my  knowledge  of  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle  exists  as  an 
event  in  my  mind. 

Whatever  is  temporal  exists.  This  seems  to  be  generally 
admitted,  for  those  thinkers  who  hold  that  truths  and  ideas 
have  a  reality  which  is  not  existence,  admit  that  such  reality 
would  be  timeless.  Whatever  is  temporal  then,  and  is  real 
at  all,  exists.  But  is  the  converse  true  ?  Is  all  existence 
temporal  ? 

All  existence  which  presents  itself  as  part  of  our  or- 
dinary world  of  experience  presents  itself  as  temporal.  But 
there  may  be  reality  which  does  not  present  itself  to  us  in 


A.. 


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J, 


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the  ordinary  course  of  things,  though  search  may  reveal  its 
presence.  And,  again,  a  thing  may  present  itself  in  a  more 
or  less  deceptive  fashion.  And  it  is  frequently  maintained 
that  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  some  reality  which  exists, 
exists  timelessly — not  merely  in  the  sense  that  its  existence 
endures  through  unending  time,  but  in  the  deeper  sense  that 
it  is  not  in  time  at  all. 

5.  The  possibility  of  timeless  existence  has  been  denied. 
Lotze,  for  example,  makes  time  an  essential  characteristic  of 
existence — his  terminology  is  different  but  it  comes  to  this. 
But  the  general  opinion  of  thinkers  has  been  the  other  way. 
For  most  men  have  believed  in  the  existence  of  a  God,  and 
most  of  those  who  have  not  believed  in  a  God  have  believed 
in  the  existence  of  some  impersonal  Absolute.  And  God  or 
the  Absolute  has  generally  been  conceived  as  timeless.  This 
has  not  been  universal.  Lotze  regards  God  as  existing  in 
time.  And  among  theological  writers  there  have  doubtless 
been  some  who,  when  they  called  God  eternal,  only  meant 
that  he  existed  through  endless  time,  or  that  his  nature  did 
not  change.  But  as  a  rule  philosophy  and  theology  have 
held  that  God  exists  timelessly. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  opinion — that  timeless  existence 
is  possible — is  correct.  To  exist  and  to  be  in  time  seem  to 
me  two  characteristics,  each  quite  distinct  from  the  other. 
And,  while  it  seems  clear  that  nothing  could  be  in  time 
without  existing,  I  fail  to  see  any  corresponding  impossibil- 
ity in  something  existing  without  being  in  time.  If  so,  time- 
less existence  is  possible.  Whether  it  is  actual — whether  we 
have  reason  to  believe  that  anything  does  exist  out  of  time 
— is  a  question  which  I  shall  not  discuss  in  this  paper.  My 
object  here  is  only  to  discuss  the  relation  of  existence  in 
Time  to  existence  in  Eternity,  should  there  be  any  such  eter- 
nal existence. 

6.  We,  who  are  endeavoring  to  estimate  the  relation,  ap- 
pear to  ourselves  to  exist  in  time,  whether  we  really  do  so 
or  not.     It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  men  should  have 


• »» I  »♦ 


'-g^Ofc^fc-  •tJfcigs-'? 


»-tt  .-J  1  ^.T'.-rr.ts»i-7il^«-:.. 


M^ 


8 


endeavored  to  express  their  relation  to  the  Eternal  by  terms 
borrowed  from  Time,  and  to  say  that  the  Eternal  is  present, 
past,  or  future.  We  shall  consider  which  of  these  terms  is 
the  most  appropriate  metaphor,  and  whether  any  of  them 
are  more  than  metaphors. 

In  the  first  place,  we  may  consider  that  existence  in  Time 
and  existence  in  Eternity  are  equally  real.  Then,  since  the 
same  thing  clearly  cannot  exist  both  in  time  and  timelessly 
— if  both  predicates  are  taken  in  the  same  sense  and  as 
equally  real — the  only  possibility  would  be  that  some  exist- 
ent being  was  in  time,  and  some  existent  being  was  out  of  it. 
(This  is  exemplified  in  the  very  common  theological  view, 
according  to  which  God  exists  timelessly,  but  everything  else 
exists  in  time.)  What  would  the  relation  be,  in  such  a  case, 
between  the  temporal  and  the  eternal  1 

The  eternal  is  often  spoken  of,  under  these  circum- 
stances, as  an  ** eternal  present."  As  a  metaphor  this  has, 
as  we  shall  see,  some  appropriateness,  but  it  cannot,  I  think, 
be  taken  as  more  than  a  metaphor.  ** Present''  is  not  like 
** existence''  a  predicate  which  can  be  applied  in  the  same 
sense  to  the  temporal  and  the  timeless.  On  the  contrary,  its 
meaning  seems  to  include  a  distinct  reference  to  time,  and  a 
distinct  reference  to  past  and  future.  The  Present  has  been 
future  and  will  be  past.  I  do  not  say  this  is  an  adequate 
definition  of  the  present,  but  it  does  seem  to  be  an  essential 
characteristic  of  the  present.  If  so,  the  timeless  cannot  be 
present.  The  eternal,  the  timeless,  must  be  distinguished 
from  what  exists  unchanged  in  time.  The  Pyramids  exist 
in  time,  but  they  have  existed  through  thousands  of  years, 
through  all  of  which  they  have  been  present.  And  suppos- 
ing that  human  beings  were  really  in  time,  but  also  im- 
mortal, we  could  say  of  every  man,  after  he  had  been  bom, 
that  he  would  be  endlessly  present,  since  in  every  moment 
of  future  time  he  would  exist.  But  persistence  through 
time  is,  as  we  have  seen,  quite  a  different  thing  from  time- 
less existence. 


•    \ 


«>i  ■» 


•  .> 


) 
•  I  • 

T 


•  * 


'    k 


7.  There  is  one  reason  which  has,  I  think,  led  to  regard- 
ing the  eternal  as  an  eternal  present,  which  rests  on  a  con- 
fusion. Of  anything  which  exists  in  time,  my  judgment 
**It  is  true  that  X  exists  now"  is  true  when  X  is  in  the 
present  and  not  when  X  is  in  the  future  or  past.  Now  sup- 
posing that  Z  exists  eternally,  my  judgment  *  *  It  is  now  true 
that  Z  exists"  will  be  always  true.  Hence,  I  believe,  it  is 
sometimes  supposed  that  Z  is  always  present.  But  this  is  a 
confusion.  For  **It  is  now  true  that  Z  exists,"  where  the 
*'now"  refers  to  the  truth  of  the  judgment  that  Z  exists,  is 
by  no  means  the  same  as  **It  is  true  that  Z  exists  now," 
where  the  **now"  refers  to  the  existence  of  Z.  A  judgment 
is  a  psychical  event  in  my  mind,  and  is  in  time,  even  if  I  am 
judging  of  the  timeless,  so  that  **now"  is  an  appropriate 
word  to  use  about  it.  But  **now"  cannot  be  used  about  the 
existence  of  the  timeless  itself. 

8.  As  a  metaphor,  however,  there  is  considerable  fitness 
in  calling  the  eternal  a  present.  In  the  first  place,  the 
future  and  the  past  are  always  changing  their  positions  in 
regard  to  us.  The  future  is  always  coming  nearer,  while 
yet  remaining  future.  The  past  is  always  going  farther 
away,  while  yet  remaining  past.  The  present,  however, 
while  it  remains  present,  does  not  change  in  this  way.  It  is 
continually  being  born  out  of  what  was  the  future.  It  is 
continually  changing  into  the  past.  But  as  present  it  does 
not  change  in  its  relation  to  us. 

This  affords  a  certain  analogy  to  the  timeless  which,  of 
course,  is  not  capable  of  change.  The  timeless  does  not 
change,  and  therefore,  nothing  in  the  timeless  can  bring  it 
nearer  to  us  or  farther  from  us.  And  the  constancy  which 
this  involves  has  an  analogy  with  the  constancy  of  the  pres- 
ent while  it  remains  present. 

9.  In  the  second  place  the  present  is  always  regarded  as 
having  more  reality  than  the  past  or  future.  So  much  is 
this  the  case  that  we  feel  no  inappropriateness  in  saying  of 
something  which  is  not  existing  at  present  that  it  does  not 


41 « 

•      It 


>»  • 


r  nT,  fT-i 


rr-tmrntm^Sf^t^'ti'  «jUie'B<BF»gLL-«j<jii  wa-g- 


Ttrmaa 


'■^  "T'-'"  '^'  '  ■CJ^mST'?*"'^' 


10 


exist.  We  should  not  feel  the  expression  unusual  if  we  said 
that  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  does  not  exist,  which  is  the 
same  expression  we  should  use  of  More's  Utopia.  And  yet 
we  no  more  mean  to  deny  the  past  existence  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  than  we  mean  to  deny  the  present  existence 
of  the  United  Kingdom.  Now  the  eternal  does  not  appear 
with  the  diminished  reality  of  the  past  and  future.  It  has 
all  the  reality  of  which  its  nature  admits.  And  the  eternal 
is  generally  considered  as  more  real  than  the  temporal,  for, 
when  some  reality  is  held  to  be  eternal  and  some  temporal, 
it  is  God  or  the  Absolute  which  is  considered  eternal,  and 
the  created  or  finite  which  is  considered  temporal.  It  will 
thus  resemble  the  reality  of  the  present  more  than  the  reality 
of  the  past  or  future,  and  so  it  will  be  an  appropriate  meta- 
phor to  regard  it  as  present.  This  is  especially  the  case 
when  we  consider  our  emotions  toward  the  eternal — a  point 
of  great  importance  since  the  eternal  in  this  case  would  be, 
as  we  have  just  said,  God  or  the  Absolute.  It  is  clear  that 
the  emotions  of  a  man  who  loved  an  eternal  God  would  stand 
much  closer  to  the  emotions  of  a  man  who  loved  a  being 
existent  in  present  time  than  they  would  the  emotions  of  a 
man  who  loved  a  being  who  had  ceased  to  exist,  or  who  had 
not  yet  come  into  existence. 

10.  In  the  third  place  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  is 
only  the  present,  and  not  the  past  or  future,  which  we  re- 
gard as  capable  of  exercising  immediate  causal  influence. 
The  future  is  not  conceived  as  being  a  cause  at  all — since 
causality  always  goes  towards  what  comes  later,  and  never 
back  towards  what  is  earlier.  The  past  is  certainly  regarded 
as  acting  as  a  cause,  but  not  immediately.  The  past  has  pro- 
duced the  present,  and  so  is  the  remote  cause  of  what  the 
present  is  now  occupied  in  producing.  But  it  is  not  the  im- 
mediate cause  of  what  is  now  being  produced.  This,  I 
think,  is  the  inevitable  way  of  looking  at  causality  in  con- 
nection with  time.  If  it  leads  to  contradictions — and  I  do 
not  say  that  it  does  not — they  are  contradictions    which 


.*  I  s 


«i  1 1 


«<    f  :3 


.     ^ 


•    ¥ 


11 


spring  from  the  nature  of  time.  They  may  affect  our  judg- 
ment as  to  whether  time  is  ultimately  real,  but  we  cannot 
get  rid  of  them  while  we  are  looking  at  things  in  time. 

Now  the  eternal  can  be  looked  on  as  a  cause.  I  do  not 
wish  to  enquire  whether  the  view  is  correct,  which  is  often 
held,  that  the  eternal  can  be  the  sole  cause  of  anything.  But 
there  is  no  doubt  that,  if  anything  eternal  exists,  it  can  be  a 
part-cause  of  an  effect,  so  that  the  result  would  be  different 
from  what  it  would  have  been  except  for  that  eternal  being. 
And  the  causation  of  this  eternal  being  must  be  regarded 
as  immediate,  in  the  same  way  as  the  causation  of  a  being 
present  in  time.  For  this  reason,  also,  then,  the  present  is 
an  appropriate  metaphor  for  the  eternal.  But  it  cannot  be 
more  than  a  metaphor.  Presentness  involves  time,  and  can- 
not be  predicated  of  the  timeless. 

11.  We  must  now  consider  another  theory  on  the  subject 
of  timeless  existence.  This  holds  that  all  existence  is  really 
timeless,  and  that  the  prima  facie  appearance  of  Time  which 
our  experience  presents  is,  in  reality,  only  an  appearance, 
which  disguises  the  nature  of  the  timeless  reality.  In  this 
case  we  shall  not,  as  in  the  previous  case,  divide  all  existence 
into  two  facts,  one  eternal  and  one  temporal.  All  existence 
will  be  eternal.  And  though  this  will  exclude  the  possibil- 
ity of  any  of  it  being  really  temporal,  yet  it  will  leave  the 
possibility  open  that  some,  or  even  all,  of  it  may  appear  to 
us  as  temporal. 

The  theory  of  the  unreality  of  Time  is  doubtless  very 
difficult  to  grasp  fully.  And  doubtless  it  presents  very 
many  difficulties.  I  do  not  intend,  in  this  paper,  to  advocate 
it,  or  even  to  develop  it  at  length,  but  merely  to  consider,  as 
before,  what  would  be  the  relation  of  Time  to  Eternity, 
should  the  theory  be  true.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  it  is 
worth  while  to  consider  the  consequences  of  this  theory.  For 
it  is  one  which  is  very  largely  held  by  philosophers.  The 
exact  nature  of  Eternity  in  Spinoza's  philosophy,  and  its 
relation  to  time  is  a  very  difficult  problem,  especially  since 


I 


« t 


.i\ 


»> 


«     I      * 

« 


12 

it  is  not  improbable  that  Spinoza  himself  did  not  distinguish 
with  sufficient  clearness  between  the  timelessness  of  truths 
and  the  timelessness  of  existence.  But  the  doctrine  that  all 
reality  is  timeless  was  unquestionably  held  by  Kant— though 
he  would  not  perhaps  have  used  this  expression.  It  was 
held  by  Schopenhauer.  It  was  a  fundamental  doctrine  of 
Hegel's  philosophy,  and  in  this  respect  Hegelians  have  fol- 
lowed their  master  more  closely  than  has  been  the  case  with 
other  doctrines.  And,  at  the  present  day,  it  is  held  by  the 
greatest  of  living  philosophers,  Mr.  Bradley.  If  we  turn 
from  philosophers  to  theologians  we  shall  find  the  same  doc- 
trine. The  view  that  all  reality  is  timeless  is  not  so  general, 
of  course,  among  theologians,  as  the  view  that  some  reality 
is  timeless.  But  theology  has  never  in  any  country  or  in 
any  age,  remained  for  long  together  untouched  by  mysticism. 
And  the  unreality  of  time,  although  it  is  not  held  by  all 
mystics,  is  one  of  the  most  characteristic  mystical  tenets. 

Once  more  in  the  Far  East,  where  philosophy  and  theol- 
ogy do  not  admit  even  of  that  partial  distinction  which  is 
possible  in  the  West,  we  find  the  doctrine  of  the  unreality  of 
time  assumes  cardinal  importance. 

A  theory  which  has  attracted  so  much  support,  and 
which  continues  to  attract  so  much  at  the  present  day,  must, 
right  or  wrong,  have  much  to  be  said  in  its  favor.  Teachers 
so  great,  and  so  different,  do  not  adopt  such  a  doctrine  with- 
out grave  reasons.  For  my  part  I  am  convinced  that  in 
spite  of  the  very  great  difficulties  which  belong  to  the  theory, 
it  must  be  accepted  as  true.  But  at  present  I  am  merely 
concerned  to  point  out  that,  whether  the  theory  be  true  or 
false,  it  is  no  waste  of  time  to  consider  any  consequences 
that  would  follow  from  accepting  it. 

12.  What  is  the  precise  description  which  we  must  give 
to  Time  on  this  theory  1  We  cannot  call  it  a  mistake,  for  to 
perceive  things  in  time  does  not  necessarily  involve  an  er- 
roneous judgment.  If  a  person  who  perceives  things  as  in 
time  believes  that  they  really  are  in  time,  that  would  of 


i. 


/s 


i<*  •'«• 


•     W'f^ 


«  « 


18 


course  be  an  erroneous  judgment.  But  if  the  theory  is  true, 
a  person  who  believed  the  theory  would  not  be  making  any 
erroneous  judgments  on  the  subject.  His  judgment  would 
be  *  *  I  perceive  things  as  in  time,  and  I  cannot  perceive  them 
any  other  way,  but  they  are  not  really  in  time,  but  time- 
less.*' In  this  judgment  there  would  be  no  error.  And 
thus  the  perception  of  things  in  time  must  not  be  called  a 
mistake.  It  hides,  more  or  less,  the  true  nature  of  things, 
but  it  does  not  involve  making  any  false  judgment  about 
their  nature. 

And  since  the  perception  of  things  in  time  does  not  neces- 
sarily involve  an  error,  it  follows  that,  when  the  error  has 
been  there,  and  is  removed,  it  will  not  alter  the  perception 
of  things  in  time.  If  I  begin  by  holding  the  view — which 
may  be  wrong,  but  is  certainly  the  most  obvious  view — ^that 
things  are  really  in  time,  and  are  then  convinced  by  philo- 
sophical arguments  that  they  are  really  timeless,  I  shall, 
none  the  less,  continue  to  perceive  the  things  in  time. 

Thus  we  must  conceive  our  perception  of  things  in  time 
to  be  an  illusion,  of  the  same  character  as  those  which  make 
us  see  the  sun  at  sunset  larger  than  at  midday,  and  make  us 
see  a  straight  stick  crooked  when  it  enters  the  water.  I  do 
not,  after  childhood,  suppose  the  stick  to  be  really  crooked. 
But  however  clearly  I  may  satisfy  myself,  either  by  reason- 
ing or  by  the  sense  of  touch,  that  the  stick  has  not  changed 
its  shape  since  it  was  put  in  the  water,  I  shall  continue  to 
get  visual  sensations  from  it  resembling  those  which  would 
be  given  me  by  a  crooked  stick  in  the  air.  Of  this  sort  is  the 
illusion  of  time — though  it  is  far  more  general,  and  far  more 
difficult  to  grasp.  It  hides  part  of  the  truth,  it  suggests  a 
wrong  judgment — for  the  obvious  conclusion  from  our  ex- 
perience, as  I  said  just  now,  is  to  hold  that  things  are  really 
in  time.  But  it  does  not  necessarily  involve  a  wrong  judg- 
ment, and  it  is  not  removed  by  a  right  judgment. 

13.  What  relation,  then,  does  Time  bear  to  Eternity  on 
such  a  theory  as  this?    The   answer  will,   I  thing,  vary. 


;;;i 


-Ai 


4"  <> 


*     I      * 


14 


When  we  see  existence  under  the  form  of  time,  the  theory 
tells  us,  to  see  it  more  or  less  as  it  really  is  not.  At  the  same 
time,  the  appearance  is  not  mere  illusion.  We  perceive,  in 
spite  of  this  illusive  form  of  time,  some  of  the  real  nature 
of  the  timeless  reality.  So  if  we  look  through  a  window  of 
red  glass  we  shall  see  the  objects  outside  correctly  as  to  their 
form,  size,  and  motion,  though  not  correctly  as  to  their  color. 
The  question  is,  of  course,  much  more  complicated  here.  We 
cannot  get  round  on  the  other  side  of  time,  as  we  can  on  the 
other  side  of  the  glass,  and  so  discover  by  direct  observation 
what  part  of  our  previous  experience  was  due  to  the  form  of 
time.  And  to  reach  and  justify  an  idea  of  what  the  true 
timeless  nature  of  existence  may  be  is  a  very  hard  task, 
though  I  think  not  an  impossible  one.  We  must  content 
ourselves  here  with  the  general  results  that  where  existence 
appears  to  us  under  the  form  of  time,  we  see  it  partly,  but 
not  entirely,  as  it  really  is. 

Thus  the  way  in  which,  at  any  moment  of  time,  we  re- 
gard existence  is  more  or  less  inadequate.  And  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  relation  of  time  to  Eternity  depends  on  the 
relative  inadequacy  of  our  view  of  reality  at  different  mo- 
ments of  time. 

The  decisive  question — this  is  the  theory  I  wish  to  put 
before  you — is  whether  there  is  any  law  according  to  which 
states  in  time,  as  we  pass  from  earlier  states  to  later,  tend 
to  become  more  adequate  or  less  adequate  representations  of 
the  timeless  reality. 

14.  Let  us  first  consider  what  would  happen  if  there  were 
no  such  law.  In  that  case  there  would  be  no  tendency  for 
the  future,  because  it  was  future,  to  resemble  the  timeless 
reality  more  or  less  than  the  present  does.  There  might  be 
oscillations,  even  then,  in  the  adequacy  with  which  time  rep- 
resented Eternity.  At  one  moment  my  view  of  the  universe 
might  distort  the  truth  either  more  or  less  than  my  view 
of  the  moment  before  had  distorted  it.  But  such  oscil- 
lations are  like  the  waves  of  the  sea.       At  a  particular 


*  t 


I 


ttw 


.,. 


/  ^ 


.  '• 


« « 


15 


moment  the  surface  at  a  particular  point  may  be  higher  than 
at  the  moment  before.  But  this  does  not  give  us  the  least 
reason  for  concluding  that  an  hour  later  on  it  will  also  be 
higher  than  it  was  at  the  past  moment,  or  that  the  average 
height  is  rising. 

If  the  adequacy  of  the  time-representations  is  in  this  con- 
dition, the  relation  of  Time  to  Eternity  will,  I  think,  be  ex- 
pressible in  the  same  way  in  which  we  expressed  it  when 
Time  and  Eternity  were  taken  as  equally  real.  That  is  to 
say,  the  most  appropriate  metaphor  for  the  relation  is  to 
consider  Eternity  as  a  present,  but  this  is  nothing  more  than 
a  metaphor. 

The  metaphor  is  appropriate  for  the  same  reasons  as  it 
was  before.  In  the  first  place,  the  relation  of  Eternity  to 
time  is  constant.  In  some  particular  moments  of  time  we 
may,  as  I  have  said,  get  a  less  adequate  representation  of 
Eternity  than  at  others,  but  if  we  take  time  as  a  whole  it 
neither  approximates  to  Eternity  nor  diverges  from  it. 
And,  for  the  reasons  explained  above,  there  is  a  certain  ap- 
propriateness in  using  presentness  as  a  metaphor  for  this 
unchanging  relation. 

In  the  second  place,  the  metaphor  is  appropriate  here, 
as  it  was  before,  to  express  the  reality  of  the  eternal.  The 
eternal  has  not  that  diminished  reality  which  we  attribute 
to  the  past  and  the  future.  Indeed,  its  reality  is  relatively 
greater  here  than  it  was  on  the  other  theory.  In  that  theory 
the  Eternal  was  generally  the  most  real,  for  it  generally  in- 
cluded God  or  the  Absolute.  But  here  it  is  an  inevitable 
result  of  the  theory  that  the  Eternal  is  not  only  the  most 
real,  but  the  only  true  reality.  It  is  more  important  than 
before,  therefore,  to  express  it  by  a  metaphor  drawn  from 
the  greatest  reality  in  time. 

In  the  third  place,  the  Eternal  must  certainly,  on  this 
theory,  be  regarded  as  exercising  immediate  causal  influence, 
or,  rather,  as  having  a  quality  of  which  causal  influence  is 
an  imperfect  representation.  For  everything  depends  on 
the  nature  of  the  eternal,  which  is  the  only  true  reality. 


■~-\ 


16 


At  the  same  time,  to  say  that  the  eternal  is  eternally 
present  remains  a  metaphor  only.  It  is  not  a  literally  cor- 
rect description.  For  the  present,  as  we  saw,  is  essentially 
a  time-determination,  and  the  eternal  is  not  in  Time. 

15.  So  far,  I  think,  I  have  not  said  much  that  is  contro- 
versial, and  certainly  nothing  that  I  should  claim  as  original. 
But  I  have  now  a  thesis  to  put  forward  which,  whether  it  is 
original  or  not,  is  certainly  controversial.  I  submit  that  al- 
though to  us,  who  judge  from  the  midst  of  the  time-series, 
the  presentness  of  the  eternal  can  never  be  more  than  a 
metaphor,  yet,  under  certain  conditions,  the  assertion  that 
the  eternal  was  past  or  future  might  be  much  more  than  a 
metaphor.  This  statement  will  doubtless  seem  highly  para- 
doxical. The  eternal  is  the  timeless,  and  how  can  the  time- 
less have  a  position  in  the  time-series  ?  Still,  I  believe  this 
position  can  be  defended,  and  I  will  now  attempt  to  sketch 

» 

my  defense  of  it. 

16.  So  far  we  have  considered  what  would  happen  if 
there  were  no  law  according  to  which  states  in  time,  as  we 
pass  from  earlier  states  to  later,  tend  to  become  more 
adequate  or  less  adequate  representations  of  the  timeless 
reality.    But  what  would  happen  if  there  were  such  a  law  ? 

Events  in  time  take  place  in  an  order — a  fixed  and  ir- 
reversible order.  The  flash  of  a  distant  cannon  is  perceived 
before  the  report.  The  report  is  not  perceived  before  the 
flash.  The  Battle  of  Waterloo  was  fought  before  the  Re- 
form Bill  was  passed.  The  Reform  Bill  was  not  passed  be- 
fore the  Battle  of  Waterloo  was  fought.  Now  what  deter- 
mines this  order  ? 

The  mere  form  of  time  does  not  do  so.  If  things  happen 
in  time  they  must  happen  in  an  order,  and  a  fixed  and  ir- 
reversible order.  So  much  the  nature  of  time  demands. 
But  it  gives  us  no  help  as  to  what  the  order  shall  be.  If 
the  Battle  of  Waterloo  and  the  passing  of  the  Reform  Bill 
are  to  take  place  in  time  at  all,  the  nature  of  time  requires 
either  that  they  shall  be  simultaneous  or  that  the  Battle  shall 


^    4^ 


*       ) 


•'      U 


.    •'    ^ 


♦        -4 
i 


I 


9t;^ 


,0  ^  ' 


»         • 


.  ♦'•  * 


;  \ 


»  # 


17 


precede  the  Bill,  or  that  the  Bill  shall  precede  the  Battle. 
But  it  gives  us  no  help  towards  determining  which  of  these 
three  alternatives  shall  be  taken. 

What  does  determine  the  order  of  events  in  time,  on  the 
supposition,  which  we  are  now  discussing,  that  Time  is  only 
an  illusory  way  of  regarding  a  timeless  reality  ?  I  believe 
myself  that  there  is  good  reason  to  hold  that  the  order  is  de- 
termined by  the  adequacy  with  which  the  states  represent 
the  eternal  reality,  so  that  those  states  come  next  together 
which  only  vary  infinitesimally  in  the  degree  of  their  ad- 
equacy, and  that  the  whole  of  the  time-series  shows  a  steady 
process  of  change  of  adequacy— I  do  not  say  yet  in  which 

direction. 

I  think  something  can  be  said  towards  proving  this  state- 
ment, but  it  would  want  far  more  than  a  single  lecture  to 
say  it,  and  I  do  not  propose  even  to  sketch  it  now.  Nor  is  it 
necessary  for  our  present  purpose,  which  is  only  to  consider 
what  the  relation  of  Time  to  Eternity  would  be  under  vari- 
ous circumstances.  Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  what 
that  relation  would  be  under  these  circumstances. 

17.  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  the  states  of  the  time-series 
were  such  that  each  state  was  a  more  adequate  expression  of 
the  reality  than  the  state  on  one  side  of  it,  and  a  less  ad- 
equate representation  of  reality  than  the  state  on  the  other 
side  of  it,  so  that  they  formed  a  continuous  series  in  respect 
of  the  adequacy  of  their  representation.  And  let  us  sup- 
pose that  the  most  adequate  of  these  representations— which 
will  be,  of  course,  at  one  end  of  the  series— differs  from  the 
reality  it  represents  only  by  an  infinitesimal  amount.  What 
is  the  relation  here  between  Time  and  Eternity? 

This  will  depend  upon  the  direction  in  the  series  in  which 
greater  adequacy  is  to  be  found.  It  may  be,  in  the  first 
place,  that  the  later  stages  of  the  time-series  are  more  ad- 
equate than  the  earlier  stages.  In  that  case  the  present 
stage  will  be  more  adequate  than  any  of  the  past,  and  less 
adequate  than  any  of  the  future. 


•      ^ 


¥h- 


»  w»  t 


18 


19 


We  may  go  further  than  this.  If  time  is  unreal,  as  we 
have  supposed,  then  the  illusion  that  time  exists  can  no  more 
be  in  time  than  anything  else  can.  The  time-series,  though 
a  series  which  gives  us  the  illusion  of  Time,  is  not  itself  in 
time.  And  the  series  is  really  therefore  just  a  series  of  rep- 
resentations, some  more  adequate  and  some  less  adequate, 
arranged  in  the  order  of  their  adequacy.  This — the  series 
of  adequacy — is  the  only  serial  element  which  remains  as 
real,  if  time  is  to  be  condemned  as  unreal. 

When,  therefore,  we  say  that  a  certain  stage  in  the  time- 
series  is  still  in  the  future,  the  real  truth,  if  the  theory  we 
are  considering  is  correct,  is  that  the  stage  in  question  is  a 
less  inadequate  representation  of  the  timeless  reality  of 
existence  than  our  present  stage. 

Now  the  timeless  reality  itself  contains  all  its  own  nature. 
And  therefore  it  will  stand  to  the  least  inadequate  of  the 
representations  of  itself  as  this  stands  to  the  next  least  in- 
adequate, and  so  on.  Since,  by  our  hypothesis,  the  repre- 
sentations of  reality  in  the  time-series  approach  the  reality 
till  the  inadequacy  finally  becomes  infinitesimal,  the  last  of 
the  series  of  time-representations  will  differ  only  infinites- 
imally  from  the  reality  itself.  And,  since  time  is  contin- 
uous, the  stage  before  the  last  will  differ  from  the  last  in 
the  same  way — by  being  infinitesimally  less  adequate. 

Thus  the  timeless  reality — the  Eternal — may  itself  be 
considered  as  the  last  stage  in  a  series,  of  which  the  other 
stages  are  those  which  we  perceive  as  the  time-series, — those 
stages  nearest  to  the  timeless  reality  being  those  which  we 
perceive  as  the  later  stages  in  time.  When,  therefore,  we 
are  looking  at  things  as  in  time — as  we  must  look  at  them — 
we  must  conceive  the  Eternal  as  the  final  stage  in  the  time- 
process.  We  must  conceive  it  as  being  in  the  future,  and 
as  being  the  end  of  the  future.  Time  runs  up  to  Eternity, 
and  ceases  in  Eternity. 

18.  This  conclusion  will  doubtless  be  rejected  by  many 
people  without  further  examination  as  grossly  absurd.    How 


./   I  *. 


4«H 


•    /  k 


■■ 


:  l\ 


» • 


^ 


can  the  timeless  have  a  position  at  the  end  of  a  time-series? 
How  can  Eternity  begin  when  Time  ceases  ?  How  can  Eter- 
nity begin  at  all  ? 

The  answer  to  these  objections,  I  think,  is  as  follows :  Of 
course,  on  this  view,  Eternity  is  not  really  future,  and  does 
not  really  begin.  For  Time  is  unreal,  and  therefore  noth- 
ing can  be  future,  and  nothing  can  begin.  What,  then,  is 
the  justification  of  regarding  Eternity  as  future  ?  It  lies,  I 
maintain,  in  the  fact  that  Eternity  is  as  future  as  anything 
can  be.  It  is  as  truly  future  as  tomorrow  or  next  year. 
And,  therefore,  when,  taking  Time  as  real,  as  we  must  do  in 
everyday  life,  we  are  endeavoring  to  estimate  the  relation 
of  Time  to  Eternity,  we  may  legitimately  say  that  Eternity 
is  future.  From  the  point  of  view  of  time,  the  events  of 
to-morrow  and  next  year  are  future.  And  if  Eternity  is  as 
truly  future  as  they  are,  it  is  legitimate  to  say  that  Eternity 
is  future.  It  is  not  absolutely  true  but  it  is  as  true  as  any 
other  statement  about  futurity.  And  it  is  much  truer  than 
to  say  that  Eternity  is  present  or  past. 

Let  us  recapitulate.  If  time  is  unreal  then  the  time- 
series  is  a  series  of  more  or  less  adequate  representations  of 
the  timeless  reality,  and  this  series  itself  is  not  really  in  time. 
If  what  determines  the  position  of  the  stages  in  the  time- 
series  is  the  different  degrees  of  adequacy  with  which  they 
represent  the  timeless  reality,  then  the  series  which  is  not 
really  a  series  in  time,  is  really  a  series  of  degrees  of  ade- 
quacy. If  the  most  adequate  of  these  stages  has  only  in- 
finitesimal inadequacy,  then  the  timeless  reality,  in  its  own 
completeness,  forms  the  last  stage  of  the  series.  And  if 
the  distinction  between  earlier  and  later  stages  is  that  the 
later  are  the  more  adequate,  then— since  the  future  is  later 
than  the  present—we  must  place  the  timeless  reality  in  the 
future,  and  at  the  end  of  the  future. 

Thus  to  say  that  Eternity  is  future  on  this  theory  is  far 
more  accurate  than  it  was,  in  the  two  previous  cases,  to  say 
that  Eternity  was  present.     For  in  those  cases  Eternity, 


* » 


k. 


20 


21 


though  it  had  some  analogy  to  the  present,  was  not  as  fully 
present  as  to-day's  sunlight  is,  which  is  in  the  fullest  sense 
present.  But  in  this  case  Eternity  is  as  really  future  as  to- 
morrow 's  sunlight,  which  is  in  the  fullest  sense  future.  The 
presentness  of  Eternity  was  only  a  metaphor.  Its  futurity, 
in  this  case,  is  as  true  as  any  futurity. 

19.  Let  us  pass  to  another  case.  Let  us  suppose,  as  be- 
fore, that  the  truth  of  the  time-series  was  a  series  of  repre- 
sentations arranged  by  their  degrees  of  adequacy,  and  run- 
ning on  until  the  extreme  term  of  the  series  only  differed 
from  the  timeless  reality  itself  by  an  infinitesimal  amount. 
But  let  us  suppose  that  the  series  runs  the  other  way,  so  that 
it  is  the  more  adequate  members  which  appear  as  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  time-series,  and  the  less  adequate  members 
which  appear  as  the  later  stages  of  the  time-series.  In  this 
case  we  should  have  to  regard  the  timeless  reality  as  the  be- 
ginning of  the  past,  instead  of  as  the  end  of  the  future.  We 
should  have  to  regard  ourselves  as  having  started  for  it,  not 
as  destined  to  reach  it.  It  is  obvious  that  from  a  practical 
point  of  view  the  difference  between  these  two  cases  may  be 
very  great — I  shall  return  to  the  practical  importance  of 
the  relation  later  on.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  are  reasons 
for  supposing  that  the  first  of  the  two  cases  is  the  one  which 
really  exists,  and  that  Eternity  is  to  be  regarded  as  in  the 
future  and  not  as  in  the  past.  But  our  object  here  is  mere- 
ly to  realize  that,  if  the  second  case  is  true,  and  it  is  the 
more  adequate  members  which  appear  as  the  earlier,  then 
Eternity  must  be  regarded  as  in  the  past. 

20.  For  the  sake  of  completeness  we  may  mention  a  third 
case,  though  I  think  it  one  which  is  very  improbable.  Let 
us  suppose  that  the  stages  of  the  series  were  arranged,  not 
simply  in  order  of  adequacy,  but  on  some  principle  which 
placed  the  least  adequate  in  the  middle,  and  made  them  more 
adequate  as  they  diverged  from  this  at  either  end.  And  let 
us  suppose,  as  before,  that  the  more  adequate  representa- 
tions only  differed  from  the  timeless  reality  infinitesimally. 


\*   ■  K 


>• 


i 


•<   H  * 


« '    f  * 


'    fl  * 


:   t\ 


«  '  f  « 


Then  it  is  clear  that  the  timeless  reality  would  stand  to  the 
earliest  member  of  the  series,  as  that  stood  to  the  next 
earliest.  And  it  is  also  clear  that  the  timeless  reality  would 
stand  to  the  latest  member  as  this  stood  to  the  next  latest. 
And  therefore  the  timeless  reality  would  be  a  term  at  each 
end  of  the  series,  which  would  start  from  it  and  would  re- 
turn to  it.  In  that  case  we  should  have  to  consider  the  Eter- 
nal both  as  the  beginning  of  the  past,  and  the  end  of  the 

future. 

21.  Thus  we  see  that,  under  certain  suppositions,  the 
Eternal  may  be  said  to  be  past  or  future,  not  only  as  a  meta- 
phor, but  with  as  much  truth  as  anything  else  can  be  past 
or  future.    But  this  is  not  the  case  about  the  present.     On 
no  supposition  could  we  be  justified  in  saying  now  that  the 
Eternal  was  present.     If  it  were  present,  it  would  bear  the 
relation  to  our  present  position  in  the  time-series  that  the 
present  does— that  is,  of  course,  it  would  have  to  be  identical 
with  it.     And  the  timeless  reality  is  certainly  not  identical 
with  a  position  like  our  present  one,  which  represents  it  as 
in  time,  and,  therefore,  according  to  our  theory,  represents 
it  inadequately.     On  several  suppositions,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  the  most  appropriate  metaphor  for  the  Eternal  is 
that  of  an  eternal  present.     But  on  no  supposition  can  it  be 
more  than  a  metaphor. 

22.  It  remains  to  say,  as  to  the  cases  in  which  the  Eter- 
nal is  regarded  as  being  the  end  of  the  future  or  the  begin- 
ning of  the  past,  that  it  is  possible  that  the  past  or  the  future 
in  question  might  be  infinite  in  length.  I  do  not  see  any- 
thing which  should  exclude  this  supposition,  and  enable  us 
to  assert  that  the  present  has  been  reached  in  a  finite  time 
from  the  Eternal,  or  that  the  Eternal  will  be  reached  in  a 
finite  time  from  the  present. 

In  mathematics  that  which  only  happens  at  an  infinite 
distance  is  said  to  be  the  same  as  that  which  never  happens 
at  all.  Thus  two  parallel  straight  lines  are  said  to  meet  at 
an  infinite  distance.     Since  mathematicians  adopt  this  meth- 


f  • 


¥% 


4^    A-^ 


22 


23 


od  of  expression  it  has  probably  some  real  convenience  for 
mathematics.  But,  apart  from  the  conventions  of  that 
special  science,  it  seems  to  me  that  there  is  a  very  real  differ- 
ence between  a  series  such  that  it  reaches  a  result  after  an 
infinitely  long  process,  and  a  series  such  that  it  never  reaches 
that  result  at  all. 

Even,  therefore,  if  the  series  of  stages  which  intervene 
between  the  present  and  the  timeless  reality  were  such  as 
would  appear  as  an  infinitely  long  time,  I  should  see  no  im- 
propriety in  speaking  of  the  timeless  reality  as  the  extreme 
stage  of  the  series,  from  which  it  started,  or  to  which  it  at- 
tains. At  the  same  time,  I  see  no  more  reason  to  suppose  the 
length  infinite  than  to  suppose  it  finite. 

23.  I  propose  to  devote  the  rest  of  my  paper  to  a  con- 
sideration of  some  aspects  of  the  possibility  that  it  may  be 
right  to  regard  Eternity  as  the  end  of  the  future. 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  view  has  a  very  strong  resemb- 
lance to  a  very  common  Christian  view.  The  Christian 
heaven  is  sometimes  looked  upon  as  enduring  through  un- 
ending time.  But  it  is  also  often  looked  upon  as  a  timeless 
state.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  generally  looked  on  as  in  the 
future.  We  are  not  in  it  now.  We  have  not  been  in  it 
before  birth — indeed,  most  Christians  deny  that  we  existed 
at  all  before  the  birth  of  our  present  bodies.  We  are  sep- 
arated from  it  by  death — not,  indeed,  that  death  alone  would 
place  us  in  it,  but  that  we  shall  not  reach  it  till  we  have 
passed  through  death. 

This  has  not  been  the  universal  view  of  Christianity,  but 
I  think  it  cannot  be  denied  that  it  has  generally  been  held 
that  heaven  was  in  the  future.  Heaven  may  be  held  to  be 
a  state  of  the  mind,  not  a  place  or  an  environment.  But 
still  it  is  a  state  of  the  mind  which  is  yet  for  us  in  the  future. 
**Now  we  see  in  a  mirror,  darkly;  but  then  face  to  face.*' 
(1st  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians,  XIII,  12.)  The  beginning 
may  be  present  here,  but  not  the  completion.  Moreover, 
even  what  is  attained  of  it  on  earth  has  to  be  attained,  to 


/     ■   .!> 


"•j\ 


•  art 


•    if  « 


••>    W** 


t 


be  gained  where  it  was  not  before,  and  so  was  once  in  the 
future  and  is  still  for  many  men  in  the  future. 

This  view  of  the  Christian  heaven  has  been  severely 
criticised  lately,  both  from  inside  and  from  outside  Chris- 
tianity. It  has  been  said  that  heaven,  if  it  is  perfect,  must 
be  timeless,  and  that  it  is  generally  admitted  to  be  timeless, 
and  that  therefore  it  is  absurd  to  place  it  in  the  future,  and 
it  should  rather  be  regarded  as  an  eternal  present. 

The  critics  have  a  certain  subjective  justification.  They 
have  investigated  the  relation  of  Time  to  Eternity  more 
deeply  than  the  majority  of  those  who  hold  the  view  criti- 
cised. They  have  perceived  the  difficulties  of  giving  Eter- 
nity a  place  at  the  end  of  the  time-series,  while  many  of 
those  who  held  that  heaven  was  future  had  not  perceived 
those  difficulties  at  all.  Yet  we  must  hold,  I  submit,  that 
the  view  of  heaven  as  now  future  might,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, be  much  truer  than  the  view  of  heaven  as  now 
present  could  be  under  any  circumstances. 

Let  us  recapitulate  once  more  the  conditions.  The  Eter- 
nal can  be  rightly  regarded  as  future  if  time  is  unreal,  if  the 
series  which  appears  to  us  as  a  time-series  is  a  series  of  rep- 
resentations arranged  according  to  adequacy,  if  the  highest 
of  the  series  only  differs  by  an  infinitesimal  amount  from 
the  reality  represented,  and  if  it  is  the  more  adequate  rep- 
resentations which  appear  as  latest  in  the  series. 

Now  many  people  who  hold  heaven  to  be  future  would 
hold  that  it  was  attained  gradually,  by  advancing  stages 
which  got  higher  till  the  last  led  into  the  timeless  perfection 
without  any  breach  of  continuity,  and  that  the  higher  of 
these  stages  came  later.  Three  of  the  four  conditions  are 
thus  complied  with.  The  first — that  time  is  unreal — is,  of 
course,  less  frequent.  But  if  this  is  combined  with  the 
other  three — as  it  often  is,  and  may  very  well  be — ^then  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  idea  of  a  timeless  heaven  as  future  is 
quite  justifiable,  and  that  the  Christians  who  held  this  be- 
lief, while  not  seeing  so  deeply  as  such  critics  as  Mr.  Bradley 


24 


J 


and  Mr.  Haldane,  had  in  point  of  fact  grasped  the  truth, 
though  without  seeing  very  clearly  why  it  was  true. 

24.  The  practical  importance  of  the  question  whether  the 
Eternal  can  be  regarded  as  future  appears  to  me  to  be  enor- 
mous. The  supreme  question,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
practical  importance,  is  whether  good  or  evil  predominates 
in  the  universe,  and  in  what  proportion.  The  practical  im- 
portance of  philosophy  consists,  not  in  the  guidance  it  gives 
us  in  life — it  gives  us,  I  think,  very  little — but  in  the  chance 
that  it  may  answer  this  supreme  question  in  a  cheerful  man- 
ner, that  it  may  provide  some  solution  which  shall  be  a  con- 
solation and  an  encouragement. 

In  what  way  can  we  hope  to  do  this  ?  It  cannot  be  done 
by  empirical  induction.  Even  granting  that  we  have  evi- 
dence for  coming  to  a  favorable  conclusion  about  the  state 
of  people  on  this  planet  at  the  present  time — and  this  is  all 
we  can  know  empirically — it  would  be  far  too  small  a  basis 
for  an  induction  which  would  give  us  even  the  least  proba- 
bility as  to  the  universe  as  a  whole  through  the  whole  of 
time. 

The  belief  in  a  God  who  is  on  the  side  of  the  good  has 
been  one  of  the  supports  on  which  men  have  most  often 
tried  to  base  an  optimistic  solution  of  this  question.  But, 
even  if  we  accept  the  existence  of  such  a  God,  it  will  not  by 
itself  afford  sufficient  ground  for  what  we  seek.  We  are 
wrecked  against  the  old  difficulty — the  difficulty  which 
Augustine  stated  with  perfect  clearness,  and  which  theists, 
in  all  the  centuries  that  havo  passed,  have  never  avoided. 
Either  God  can  do  everything  he  likes,  and  then  evil,  since 
it  exists,  cannot  be  repugnant  to  him,  and  his  existence  af- 
fords no  ground  for  limiting  its  extent  or  duration.  Or 
else  God  cannot  do  everything  he  likes,  and  then  we  cannot 
be  certain  that  evil,  in  spite  of  God's  efforts,  may  not  pre- 
dominate over  good  now,  and  be  destined  to  increase  in  the 
future. 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  prove  the  predominance 


'"^^'  - 


25 


f% 


•  vi 


r-'v 


Ji 


'4 


.  .^. 


**> 


of  good  from  the  intrinsic  nature  of  good  and  evil.  But 
here,  as  it  seems  to  me,  any  argument  which  proves  anything 
proves  too  much,  for  they  all  tend  to  prove  that  there  is  no 
evil  at  all.  And  such  an  argument  may,  I  fear,  be  dismissed 
as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum. 

25.  What  other  course  remains — to  those  of  us  who  are 
not  so  happily  constituted  as  to  be  able  to  believe  a  thing 
because  we  want  to  believe  it?  One  attempted  solution  re- 
mains— ^that  on  which  was  reared  the  most  magnificent  op- 
timism that  philosophy  has  ever  seen,  the  optimism  of 
Hegel.  This  solution  rests  on  the  unreality  of  Time.  Only 
the  Eternal  reality  exists,  and  the  Eternal  is  perfectly  good. 
All  the  evil  which  we  suppose  to  be  in  existence  is  part  of 
the  Time-element  which  we  wrongly  suppose  to  be  in  exist- 
ence.    And  so  there  is  no  evil  at  all. 

This  solution,  however,  in  the  form  which  it  takes  with 
Hegel,  will  not  give  us  what  we  seek.  In  the  first  place,  it 
has  really  no  optimistic  result.  To  tell  us  that  evil  is  unreal 
does  not  make  what  we  think  to  be  evil  in  the  least  less  un- 
pleasant to  suffer  or  in  the  least  less  depressing  to  expect. 
And  even  if  it  had  that  effect  on  the  people  who  know  the 
truth,  how  about  the  people  who  do  not  know  it?  The  only 
ground  of  optimism  would  be  found  in  a  belief  that  this 
illusion  of  evil  was  limited  in  quantity  or  transitory  in  ap- 
parent duration.  And  the  assertion  of  its  unreality  would 
not  permit  us  to  limit  the  extent  or  the  duration  of  our  il- 
lusion of  its  reality. 

In  the  second  place,  I  do  not  think  that  the  theory  can 
be  accepted  as  true.  It  is  possible  that  there  is  no  sin  in 
existence — indeed,  if  time  is  unreal,  it  seems  inevitable  that 
there  should  be  no  sin.  It  is  even  possible  that  there  should 
be  no  pain — though  that  is  not  so  simple.  But  evil  is 
wider  than  sin  or  pain.  And  it  seems,  to  me  at  any  rate, 
certain  that  even  the  illusion  that  I  am  sinful  or  in  pain  is 
evil.  I  may  not  be  really  sinful  or  really  in  pain,  but  in 
some  sense  the  illusion  of  the  sin  or  pain  exists,  and  that  is 


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26 


a  real  evil.  If  we  doubt  it,  let  us  ask  whether  we  should  not 
think  the  universe  better  if  a  given  illusion  of  sin  or  pain 
v/as  replaced  with  an  experience  of  virtue  or  pleasure.  Or 
let  us  ask  whether  we  should  not  blame  a  creator  who  need- 
lessly inserted  such  illusions  into  the  universe  he  created. 

26.  But  if  we  abandon  the  attempt  to  base  an  optimistic 
solution  on  the  unreality  of  time  through  the  unreality  of 
evil,  yet  there  is  another  way  in  which  the  unreality  of  time 
may  help  us. 

It  is  a  certain  fact — which  may  some  day  be  accounted 
for,  but  which  cannot  be  denied,  whether  it  is  accounted  for 
or  not — that  good  and  evil  in  the  future  affect  us  quite  dif- 
ferently from  good  and  evil  in  the  past.  Let  us  suppose 
two  men,  one  of  whom  had  been  very  happy  for  a  million 
years,  and  was  just  about  to  become  very  miserable  for 
another  million  years,  while  the  other  had  been  very  miser- 
able for  a  million  years  and  was  now  about  to  be  very  happy 
for  the  same  period.  If  we  suppose  them  to  remember  the 
past  and  to  be  certain  of  the  future,  it  is  certain  that  the 
second  would  be  in  a  very  much  more  desirable  position  than 
the  first,  although  the  total  amount  of  life  which  each  would 
be  contemplating  shows  exactly  the  same  amount  of  pleasure 
and  pain. 

Past  evil,  as  such,  does  not  sadden  us  like  future  evil. 
We  may  be  saddened  by  the  results  which  it  has  left  behind 
in  the  present,  or  which  may  be  expected  to  appear  in  the 
future — if  those  results  are  themselves  evil,  which  of  course 
is  not  always  the  case  with  the  present  results  of  past  evils. 
Or  the  remembrance  of  past  evil  may  remind  us  that  the 
universe  is  not  wholly  good,  and  make  us  fear  for  evil  in 
the  future.  And  a  particular  past  evil  may  give  us,  not 
merely  this  general  apprehension,  but  particular  reasons  to 
fear  some  particular  future  evil.  And,  once  more,  if  past 
evil  has  been  caused  by  the  wickedness  of  any  person,  the 
fact  that  the  evil  has  passed  away  will  not  affect  the  fact 
that  the  responsible  person  is  still  wicked,  unless  indeed  he 
has  improved  and  repented. 


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27.  If,  therefore,  we  arrived  at  a  theory  of  the  universe 
which  was  unable  to  deny  the  existence  of  evil,  or  to  assert 
that  over  the  whole  of  time  good  predominated  over  evil,  or 
that  it  did  so  at  present,  there  would  be  still  a  chance  for 
optimism.  If  such  a  theory  were  able  to  assert  that,  what- 
ever the  state  of  the  universe  now,  it  would  inevitably  im- 
prove, and  the  state  of  each  conscious  individual  in  it  would 
inevitably  improve,  until  they  reaxihed  a  final  state  of  per- 
fect goodness,  or  at  least  of  very  great  goodness— surely 
this  would  be  accepted  as  a  cheerful  theory.  Surely  this 
would  give,  as  much  as  any  belief  can  give,  consolation  and 
encouragement  in  the  evils  of  the  present.  Indeed,  it  is 
nearly  as  favorable  a  theory  as  could  be  framed,  for  if  we 
went  much  beyond  this  in  the  direction  of  optimism,  we 
should  soon  reach  the  denial  of  evil,  and  then,  as  was  said 
above,  our  theory  would  break  itself  against  facts  which 

cannot  be  denied. 

28.  But  how  could  such  a  theory  be  established?  No 
empirical  evidence  which  we  could  reach  would  afford  even 
the  slightest  presumption  in  favor  of  such  a  vast  conclusion. 
And  how  can  we  prove  a  priori  that  good  will  predominate 
over  evil  more  in  the  future  than  it  has  in  the  past,  or  than 
it  does  in  the  present  ?  What  link  can  a  priori  reasoning 
find  between  the  later  and  the  better. 

I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be  done  if  Time  is  to  be  taken  as 
real.  But  if  Time  is  unreal,  I  do  see  a  possibility— more  I 
do  not  venture  to  say  at  present^-of  such  a  demonstration. 
I  do  see  a  possibility  of  showing  that  the  timeless  reality 
would  be,  I  do  not  say  unmixedly  good,  but  very  good,  bet- 
ter than  anything  which  we  can  now  experience  or  even 
imagine.  I  do  see  a  possibility  of  showing  that  all  that 
hides  this  goodness  from  us— in  so  far  as  it  is  hidden— is  the 
illusion  of  time.  And  I  do  see  a  possibility  of  showing  that 
the  different  representations  which  appear  to  us  as  the  time- 
series  are  in  such  an  order  that  those  which  appear  as  later 
are  the  more  adequate,  and  the  last  only  infinitesimally  dif- 


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28 


f era  from  the  timeless  reality.  In  that  case  we  must  look  on 
the  Eternal  as  the  end  of  Time ;  and  on  Time  as  essentially 
the  process  by  which  we  reach  to  the  Eternal  and  its  per- 
fection. 

The  reality  of  the  Eternal  can  only  have  comfort  for  us, 
then,  if  we  conceive  it  as  future,  since  it  is  to  the  future 
that  optimism  must  look.  Nor  do  I  see  how  we  can  regard 
the  future  optimistically  unless  we  regard  it  as  the  progres- 
sive manifestation  of  the  Eternal.  Whether  this  can  be 
done,  will  be  for  the  future  to  pronounce — the  possibilities 
of  which  I  have  spoken  may  prove  to  be  demonstrations  or 
to  be  the  merest  fallacies.  Only  I  do  see  a  chance  of  a 
happy  solution  in  the  relation  of  Time  to  Eternity,  and,  as 
philosophy  stands  at  present,  I  see  it  nowhere  else. 


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